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Abstract 
This study examines conceptual problems in measuring product and dis-
posable income of the kibbutz and in comparing them with the relevant 
national data. The inquiry was prompted by Kroll and Polovin’s paper in 
this Journal (1997), in which the authors found that per capita product and 
disposable income of the kibbutz are significantly lower than the national 
average in Israel. To carry out the analysis, we develop a formal-conceptual 
model of a national economy which consists of several sectors. Using this 
model it is shown that the “terms of trade” between the sectors – and the 
income transfers involved – have a marked effect on the per capita income 
in each sector, independent of its own productivity. In particular, two 
downward accounting biases may account for the results of Kroll and 
Polovin, regarding the kibbutz economy: the “interest effect” and the “tax 
effect”. We hope that this analysis will contribute to a better understanding 
of this issue, and also – more generally – to the national accounting theory. 
 
Key Words: National income and accounting; interest payments and debt 
financing; income tax; kibbutz. 
Introduction 
In their article in this Journal (Vol. 25/1, 1997), Yoram Kroll and Avraham Polovin 
made an interesting attempt to measure the value of product and disposable income 
(and thereby consumption and saving) in the kibbutz economy, and to compare them 
with the national statistics in Israel. Their results may be interpreted as showing a 
basic weakness and inherent inefficiency in the kibbutz economy.  
Thus, for example, the authors found that as early as 1982, when the kibbutz 
                                                        
*   The author wishes to offer special thanks to Professor Haim Barkai for his highly helpful comments. 
  Editors note: this article, like the one by Kroll and Polovin (1977) to which it refers, deals with the 
kibbutz economy that recently underwent a deep crisis accompanied by major changes. 
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economy appeared to be relatively healthy and robust, and before the deep economic 
crisis of the mid-1980s, per capita product of the kibbutz sector was only 85 percent 
of the national average. In 1989, in the midst of the crisis, per capita product in the 
kibbutz economy had declined to only 65 percent of the national average (Kroll and 
Polovin, 1997:25). 
Their article is important from a practical as well as conceptual aspect. At the 
conceptual level it was the first attempt to implement empirically the theoretical ba-
sis of using national accounting tools to analyze the kibbutz economy, developed 
previously (see below). On the practical side, the results of the measurements carried 
out were adopted and put into use by the kibbutz movements, as well as by related 
institutions and supervisory authorities such as the Arrangement Administration (re-
sponsible for the kibbutz debt restructuring arrangement intended to lead to the 
economic recovery of the kibbutz movements). This emphasizes the importance of 
examining the consistency and applicability of the methods and results in Kroll and 
Polovin’s article. 
The current study focuses on the conceptual problems of the measurement.
1 No 
doubt, the kibbutz economy is currently suffering from a severe crisis which has im-
plications for its very survival, but to analyze it thoroughly one must differentiate 
between cause and effect. In other words, it may be that it was not the inherent inef-
ficiency of the kibbutz economy that caused the crisis, but vice versa – that the 
external crisis, essentially of a financial nature, and the sharp shock it inflicted on the 
kibbutz, may have brought about what appears to be inefficiency.
2 
For this analysis, we develop a formal-conceptual model of a national economy 
that consists of several interrelated sectors that trade between them. It will be shown 
that without reference to the economic efficiency of each sector, it is the “terms of 
trade” between the sectors that affect and determine what may be interpreted as effi-
ciency or inefficiency of each sector. We will claim, accordingly, that a significant 
part of the results obtained by Kroll and Polovin (1997) may be explained by internal 
bias in the way of comparison they used, and not by the structure and economic 
situation of the kibbutz economy itself. 
The overall theoretical conclusion drawn in this current study is that great caution 
must be exercised in making comparisons of economic efficiency of sectors which 
have different characteristics and functions – for example the manufacturing (produc-
tive) sector, or the kibbutz economy – with that of the total national economy. A 
parallel could be drawn, for example, with a comparison of the strength (efficiency) 
                                                        
1  It examines the theoretical and conceptual aspects of comparing product and disposable income. It 
does not address the practical, empirical problems of gathering and processing the raw data. Nor does it 
relate to the consumption and saving variables discussed by Kroll and Polovin. These should be examined 
separately, and we may revert to them in a future article. 
2  Even if this is the case, the question can be asked: what made the kibbutz economy so vulnerable to 
the crisis? However, the answers to this question may relate less to the real economic variables discussed 
by Kroll and Polovin, and more to financial aspects such as capital structure (in particular, the level of 
equity vis-à-vis debt) and the financial management of the kibbutzim.   The Comparison of Kibbutz Productivity to National Statistics  137 
 
of a human hand or the head with that of the whole body – which has a doubtful 
meaning. 
The use of the national income approach to analyze the kibbutz economy started 
with Haim Barkai. In an earlier study (1971), Barkai had formulated the income of 
the kibbutz economy in terms of value-added, i.e., the difference between receipts 
from sales on the one hand, and payments to external factors of production (which do 
not include the labor and land provided by the kibbutz itself) on the other. Barkai 
repeats this formulation more formally thereafter in his definition of the economic 
“objective function” of the kibbutz (Barkai, 1977:269, Appendix B). 
A more explicit theoretical discussion of the use of the national accounts ap-
proach to the kibbutz economy (as opposed to the business-comercial approach) was 
first introduced, to the best of our knowledge, by the current author (Satt, 1974); 
there analyzed, inter alia, the philosophy and history of national income accounts, 
and formulated the overall conceptual framework appropriate to the kibbutz. That 
article constructs kibbutz accounts so that they include the values of income (product),
3 
consumption, savings and investment (and the “capital formation” account), as well 
as resources and uses, and debt. The article also examined quantitative methods of 
using the accounts (including linear programming to reflect “shadow prices” for   
internal activities). In addition, in that article Satt offers the possibility of extending 
the definition of income (product base), in line with modern economic theory, by 
including the value of household services and the (alternative) value of leisure. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the professional literature carried a broad discus-
sion on the subject of using national income terms to analyze the kibbutz economy. 
The contributors to the debate, which took place mainly in the Economic Quarterly 
in Israel, were Cohen (1982), Peleg (1982, 1984), and the current author (Satt, 1983, 
1984). An interesting experiment was also carried out at that time to analyze the 
moshav (smallholders’ cooperative settlements) economy using national accounting 
tools (Zusman and Gal, 1984). 
The structure of the current paper is as follows: the next section deals with the 
general background to the measurement of national income; essentially, it addresses 
the efficiency criterion vis-à-vis the welfare criterion. Accordingly, the conventional 
narrow approach to national accounts will be compared with the more modern – ex-
tended approach. The following sections will deal with the main problems 
encountered in Kroll and Polovin’s 1997 study, with the third section addressing the 
“interest effect”, and the fourth section – the “tax effect”. 
These sections discuss the central question of this study: for the purpose of as-
sessing efficiency, can the results relating to any one specific sector be compared 
with those of the economy as a whole, and what conclusions can be drawn? For this 
purpose a formal-conceptual model is developed herein as well as an illustrative ex-
ample relating to a multi-sector economy. For simplicity and a better readability, the 
numerical example is given in the text itself wherein the complete formal model is 
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relegated to the appendices. However, there is a full consistency between them, and 
the reader who is familiar with theoretical models is advised to consult the formal 
model at the relevant times and section. Finally, the last section summarizes the article. 
The objectives of income measurement: A general background 
The productivity of the kibbutz economy 
Kroll and Polovin (1997:30) conclude that “Throughout the crisis period, and even 
before, the economic performance of the kibbutz appears to be poor, relative to that 
of the other sectors of the Israeli economy”.  
Certainly, the inherent problem of the efficiency of the kibbutz economy must not 
be taken lightly. This issue is not a new one, and has been hanging over the kibbutz 
since its establishment some ninety years ago. It is important to bear in mind that for 
ideological reasons kibbutzim opted to run a complex economy based on agriculture, 
industry and services in a democratic and egalitarian manner. Thus there may well be 
an economic price for the ideological principles. Nevertheless, Kroll and Polovin’s 
findings contradict in some way the results of earlier studies. 
Barkai summarizes the findings of his comprehensive study on the kibbutz in the 
following words: 
 
The wealth of data we gathered enabled us to describe the growth of the 
kibbutz movement over six decades in quantitative terms: the population 
growth from a few dozen to over 100,000 members, and the concomitant 
growth in productive capacity and its achievements in the areas of produc-
tion and income distribution… This research shows that the kibbutz as a 
collective  achieved performance levels no worse, to say the least, than 
comparable firms operating according to the normal market rules.  
 
This leads him to the conclusion that: 
 
These findings refute the claim raised in the intense debate on the subject in 
the 1920s that the kibbutz is essentially not viable, since it rejects the use of 
material incentives, and severs the connection between individuals’ (per-
sonal) contribution to production and their real income.  
(Both quotes are from Barkai, 1980: introduction; emphases are mine, E. S.) 
 
Note that Barkai avoided a comparison of like with unlike. He compares the kibbutz 
with comparable firms. His data extend only up to a little after 1970; the question 
may therefore be asked: did this positive trend change in the 1970s, and particularly 
in the 1980s and 1990s? If so, what caused the change? 
In a recent article on the lessons and tradition of Franz Oppenheimer, Barkai 
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kibbutz economy when he refers to Oppenheimer’s pessimistic forecast as expressed 
in his Transformation Law. 
As early as the end of the nineteenth century (in 1896) Oppenheimer had claimed 
that producer cooperatives had no future, and that they would soon cease to exist. He 
cast doubt on the potential economic efficiency of collectives (in our case, the kib-
butz) due to their democratic and egalitarian management system. On the other hand, 
he claimed that if a collective became an economic success it would accumulate capi-
tal, and the profit motive of the existing members would result in an end to their 
absorption of new members, and eventually to its becoming a capitalist firm. 
Oppenheimer’s Transformation Law, therefore, states that every successful pro-
ducer cooperative would become a closed organization. “Such a closed producer 
organization would come to the end of its function as a cooperative” (Barkai, 1999:1-3). 
This kind of prediction has recently shown to be applicable to such modern models 
as the Producer Cooperative (PC) or the Labor Managed Firm (LMF). 
This general concept was used by the current author and others to analyze the 
kibbutz economy. The studies carried out examined the long-term trends in the kib-
butz economy, particularly in relation to its integration into the external labor market 
– the employment by the kibbutz of hired labor on the one hand, and members en-
gaging in the outside labor market, on the other. This approach reveals the forces and 
processes likely to lead to the deterioration of the LMF and its conversion into a con-
ventional Capital Managed Firm (CMF). These studies formulate propositions of 
existential bounds (or if viewed from the negative aspect, areas of disintegration) for 
the kibbutz economy, that can be viewed as Transformation Laws or Impossibility 
Laws complementing Oppenheimer’s (see Satt, 1991; Satt and Ginzburg, 1992; Satt 
and Sheaffer, 1994; and Satt and Ginzburg, 1998). 
Yehuda Don (1988) produced another comprehensive study of the kibbutz econ-
omy, focusing essentially on the industrialization process it was undergoing. 
In this case too it is noteworthy that Don makes comparisons with relevant data 
relating to the industrial sector in Israel. The data in his study refer to a period up to 
1983. Although Don indicates trends which give rise to a concern regarding the de-
velopment of kibbutz industry, it is doubtful whether they provide an explanation for 
Kroll and Polovin’s severe findings. 
In summarizing his findings Don writes:  
 
In previous chapters we observed the existence of some immanent reasons 
for relative inefficiency in the Kibbutz, due to ideological constraints as 
well as insufficient levels of controls and existence of externalities, which 
have been present since the early stages of Kibbutz industrialization. In 
view of them the pertinent question that requires explanations is the past, 
and to a great extent the present, level of high efficiency. 
(Don, 1988:114; emphases are mine, E.S.) 
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In several later articles (1995, 1996, 1998) which discuss the survival of the kibbutz, 
Don offers what he calls the altruism motive as an answer to the ideological and 
structural constraints of the kibbutz (i.e., the lack of the profit motive). 
The level of welfare 
Although the distinction between the objective of efficiency and that of welfare is not 
clear cut, it is nevertheless important and significant. 
The modern approach to income measurement states that the conventional basis 
for measuring product is too narrow, and does not properly reflect the estimated level 
of  welfare. Thus, for example, the well known witticism quoted by Samuelson 
(1973:199) that if a man marries his housekeeper, national income goes down.
4 Simi-
larly, the fact that the working week is constantly being shortened over time does not 
necessarily mean that the level of welfare in the economy is falling. It may indicate a 
growing preference for leisure over goods and services, related to a higher income. 
To correct such biases and distortions requires a reformulation of the product 
base, and in particular – its extension in such a way that it encompasses the whole 
range of productive activities and consumption of household services (including those 
that bypass the market), the creation and consumption of leisure and other activities 
Robert Eisner (1988) performed an extensive and in-depth review of the literature 
on the extended approaches to modern national income accounting, which is essential 
for anyone interested in this field. 
One of the interesting examples brought by Eisner is the pioneering work per-
formed by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972, 1973). In order to emphasize the objective of 
estimating welfare, Nordhaus and Tobin changed the title of their measurement from 
GNP (Gross National Product) to MEW (Measure of Economic Welfare).
5 The au-
thors’ premise was that the ultimate purpose of economic activity is consumption, 
both present and future. To calculate the MEW measure [which Samuelson (1973: 
195) proposed calling NEW (Net Economic Welfare) to emphasize the innovation], 
Nordhaus and Tobin proposed adding categories to the conventional product base 
and to remove others, according to the welfare criterion: 
•  The MEW measure includes activities which have a positive effect on welfare. 
For example, the values of labor which bypasses the market (mainly housekeeping) 
and of leisure are imputed to the index; 
•  On the other hand, it excludes activities having a negative effect on welfare 
(“regrettable activities”) and intermediate activities required to maintain current eco-
nomic activity. Examples of these are the cost of travel to work, road maintenance, 
and even the cost of internal and external security. Nordhaus and Tobin also ex-
cluded from their measure of welfare ecological harm, overcrowding and the damage 
                                                        
4  The source of this quote is uncertain. Some attribute it to Kuznets, and others trace it as far back as 
Alfred Marshall. 
5  Nevertheless, MEW is still based on “objective” values of products, and not on “subjective” utility 
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caused by urbanization of modern society. 
Reverting to Kroll and Polovin, it would be interesting to take this opportunity to 
extend the concept of what may be taken as a measure of the relative efficiency of 
the kibbutz economy, so that it enables a comparison of the level of welfare. The 
authors did perform partial comparisons regarding two subjects: the equivalent value 
of internal services, and the value of owner-occupied housing. They did this, how-
ever, within the definition of product base accepted used in the Israeli national 
accounting, and only for the purposes of the comparison. 
A more extensive study would have been of intrinsic interest, and a priori it may 
be assumed that the kibbutz economy would have been given a higher assessment. 
The interest effect 
Economy with two sectors: manufacturing and financial 
Kroll and Polovin describe their method of calculating the gross product of the kib-
butz economy (in a schematic way) as follows: 
 
Kibbutz gross product is equal to total annual sales less payments to suppli-
ers outside the kibbutz (including hired manpower) 
less interest payments  
plus computed household services and rent on self-owned houses. 
(Kroll and Polovin, 1997:24; emphases are mine, E.S.) 
 
As will be shown below, the problems encountered in Kroll and Polovin’s article 
relate to two main points: 
•  The handling of interest payments (debt financing), which is discussed in this 
section; 
•  The income-tax effect, which is dealt with in the next section. 
These two factors are likely to cause significant accounting biases in estimates of 
the efficiency of the kibbutz economy. Moreover, both of these effects act in a nega-
tive direction, i.e., they tend to reduce what is seen as the economic efficiency of the 
kibbutz economy relative to that of the national economy.  
We will deal with the interest payments issue first. It will be seen that it is the 
most complex and of the greatest numerical significance in the analysis. As men-
tioned above, Kroll and Polovin exclude interest payments in their calculation of 
kibbutz gross product. We will claim that this approach is appropriate for (“abso-
lute”) measurement purposes but is incorrect as far as making (“relative”) 
comparisons is concerned. This is so because of the inherent structural and func-
tional asymmetry among the different sectors. 
For simplicity, the household sector is ignored in the analysis, as are the other ex-
tended approaches referred to in the previous section. There is no theoretical problem 142  E. Satt 
 
in incorporating them (see, for example, Satt, 1974 and 1983). 
To analyze the effect this had on the results of the comparison, the following 
model will be examined.  
Suppose first that the economy is a simple two-sector economy: 
1.  A manufacturing sector, which uses labor, capital and entrepreneurship to pro-
duce an aggregate final product, Y. In the context of this study, the kibbutz economy 
is included in this sector; 
2.  A financial sector, which uses labor and entrepreneurship to provide capital 
services to the producing sector.  
For simplicity, and without a loss of generality, it is assumed that all capital is 
owned by the financial sector.
6 
The three factors of production in the economy are denoted as follows: labor – L; 
capital – K; and entrepreneurship (profit) – Π. Subscripts denote the sector in which 
the factor of production is employed (where the manufacturing sector is denoted as 
No. 1, and the financial sector – as No. 2). For clarity, the “aggregate profit function” 
of the conventional commercial accounting will be shown together with the “value-
added function” of national accounting, which is derived from the former. 
The values shown below represent values of the services provided by the factors 
of production, in terms of annual flows.
7 
We will represent now an illustrative example of the economy. This is only done 
for the sake of simplicity. The reader who is familiar with theoretical models is in-
vited to consult concurrently the complete formal model in Appendix A, on which 
the example is based. 
Example A 
Assume a national economy with the following elements: 
Total number of workers in the economy, 100   L  = 100 
Number of workers in the manufacturing sector, 70,  L1 =  70 
Number of workers in the financial sector, 30,  L2  = 30 
Wages per worker is 10  w  =  10 
 
For simplicity it is assumed that there is no difference between the wage in the 
two sectors. 
                                                        
6   a.  The significance of this definition is that those who lend to financial institutions belong to this 
sector. 
  b.  If equity capital is assumed to exist in the manufacturing sector, interest debits and credits would 
have to be imputed to it in equal amounts, so that the result would not change. 
7  The terms which should have been used are: the value of (annual) capital services, instead of the 
value of capital; the value of labor services, instead of the value of labor; and the value of entrepreneur-
ship services instead of the value of entrepreneurship. The terminology used here was chosen for 
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Value of capital in the economy is 100  K  =  100 
The cost of capital (the interest rate)
8 is 6  r  =  6 
The total product of the economy is 1,500  Y  =  1,500 
 
Equations (1) to (6) of the following example enable us to calculate the values of 
aggregate profit and the value-added of each sector, and hence, of the whole economy 
(The numbers are those of the equations in the formal model, where the letter A is 
used to denote the appendix): 
1.  The aggregate profit of the manufacturing sector (No. 1) is 
(1)  200  =  1,500  − 600 – 700 
 Π 1  =  Y  −  rK  −  wL1 
  value of   =   value of  − value  of − value  of 
 entrepreneurship    product     capital     labor  
Note that r is the cost of capital, so that rK are costs of debt-financing; w is the 
wage rate, so that wL1 is the labor costs (of the manufacturing sector). 
The calculation of the value-added is based on the generally accepted method, 
i.e., it is the value of the product less expenses on outside (external) factors of pro-
duction (see, for example, Satt, 1983).
9 
Therefore, the value-added of the manufacturing sector is 
(2)  900  =  1,500  −  600  =  200   + 7 0 0  
    Y1   =   Y  −   rK   =  Π1  +   wL1 
   Value added       product     =     resources 
2.  Similarly, the aggregate profit of the financial sector (No. 2) is 
(3)  300  =  600  −  300 
 Π 2  =  rK  −  wL2  
 value  of  =  value of  –   value of 
  entrepreneurship   capital      labor  
and the value-added of the financial sector is 
(4)  600  =  600  =  300  + 3 0 0  
   Y 2  =  rK   =  Π2  +   wL2  
 Value  added    product  =   resources 
     (capital  services)   
                                                        
8  For simplicity the cost of capital has been chosen in a way that may be interpreted as a “whole per-
centage”. Anyone familiar with handling decimal fractions would arrive at the same conclusions using 
the cost of capital of 0.06 with the value of capital of 10,000. 
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3. Hence,  the total value-added of the whole economy is  
 
(5)   1,500  =  900  + 6 0 0    
 Y  = Y1  +  Y2  
But from Equations (2) and (4), Equation (5) is also equal to 
(6)  1,500  =  (1500  −  600)  + 6 0 0  
    Y = (Y  −  rK) + rK 
Equations (7) and (8) can be found in Appendix A of the formal model. 
 
Note that even this basic presentation brings out a point of great importance to the 
issue under discussion. Whereas the value of capital appears in each sector as interest 
payments or receipts, rK [see Equations (2) and (4)], at the national level the two rK 
offset each other [Equation (6)] ! This is because the capital represents the product of 
one sector – the financial sector, but it is also a factor of production (“intermediate 
product”) of another sector – the manufacturing sector. Thus including it in the over-
all product would be a case of double counting, comparable to adding the value of 
the wheat germ to the value of the loaf of bread in which it is an ingredient. 
The conclusion is that in a comparison of the per capita value-added of the manu-
facturing sector (Y1), from which financing costs have been deducted, with the value-
added of the whole economy (Y), from which financing costs have not been de-
ducted, the estimate of the efficiency of the manufacturing sector, including the 
kibbutz economy, is likely to suffer from a downward bias. 
We can see it more clearly in the following way. From the above results, the values 
per worker (or per capita)
10 can be calculated, as is done by Kroll and Polovin 
(1997). This gives: 
Total product per worker in the economy is 15.0 (= 1,500 / 100). 
Nevertheless, although the wage per worker in the manufacturing sector is 10, the 
same as in the financial sector, and this can be viewed as an approximation of the 
value of marginal product (assuming a competitive economy), the average product 
per worker is different in each of the sectors: in the financial sector it is 20.0 (= 600 / 
30), while in the manufacturing sector it is only 12.8 (= 900 / 70). 
A comparison of the per capita product in the manufacturing sector with that of the 
economy as a whole would apparently indicate inefficiency in the former. The calcula-
tion would show that product per worker in the manufacturing sector is only 85 percent 
of that in the whole economy (12.8 / 15.0). If it is assumed that the kibbutz economy is 
one of seventy production units/workers (see above) making up the manufacturing 
sector, the results obtained would be similar to those of Kroll and Polovin. 
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Clearly, such a comparison is invalid, and should be avoided. The error derives 
essentially from the use of average instead of marginal values in calculating the out-
put of factors of production, thereby attributing the whole value of the product to 
only one factor. 
To conclude the discussion of the “interest effect” (debt financing), the following 
remarks are worth noting:  
1. From a conceptual-theoretical point of view, a distinction should be made  
between the method of (“absolute”) measurement of product at the level of the various 
sectors and the comparative (“relative”) method of comparing their product with that 
of the whole economy. 
•  At the sector level, financing costs should indeed be taken into account [see 
Equations (2) to (4)]. 
•  However, care should be taken not to engage in comparing like with unlike, 
i.e., comparing a sector which has its own special characteristics with the whole 
economy [see Equation (6)]; 
2.  More empirically, note that the value-added of each sector is partly a function 
of the financing costs (rK), i.e., of the cost of capital, r, and of the size of the debt, 
K.
11  
Suppose that in pursuing a tight (anti-inflationary) monetary policy, the central 
bank in the example raised the interest rate from 6 to 10. Make the additional far-
reaching assumptions that this has no additional effects of reducing the product of the 
manufacturing sector or increasing its debt. It can be calculated from the example 
that in this case the manufacturing sector will incur an aggregate loss of 200 (instead 
of a profit of 200), and its product (value-added) will drop from 900 to 500. At the 
same time the profit of the financial sector will rise to 700, and its value-added will 
rise to 1,000. The effect of the tighter monetary policy is that while per capita prod-
uct in the economy as a whole stays unchanged at 15.0, that in the manufacturing 
sector plunges to less than a half, to 7.1, while that in the financial sector surges to 
33.3. This seems to be a good reminiscent of what occurred in Israel in the mid- and 
end-1980s. It seems that this result is more a reflection of a change in transfer pay-
ments (“terms of trade”) between the sectors, and thus a change in the income 
distribution between them, than an index of efficiency!  
The report of the United Kibbutz Movement (UKM) on the crisis period and its 




                                                        
11   As mentioned above, all capital (K) is assumed to be “foreign” (outside) capital, or debt. This is not 
far from the actual situation in most kibbutzim, especially since the crisis. 
12   The United Kibbutz Movement (UKM) accounted for approximately two-thirds of the whole kibbutz 
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On average, the real cost of capital in the crisis period rose from 5 percent 
to 12 percent a year [!]… [Largely as a result] the kibbutzim in the United 
Kibbutz Movement moved into a loss position of NIS 23 million in 1984, 
compared with an aggregate profit of NIS 137 million in 1983 and NIS 67 
million in 1982. In 1985 the loss increased and reached a total of NIS 300 
million. 
(UKM, 1989:1. At June 1988 prices; emphases are mine, E.S.) 
 
Net financing costs of the UKM went up from NIS 36 million in 1982 to NIS 365 
million in 1985 (at June 1988 prices), a tenfold increase! To put this in perspective, 
note that the average gross product of the UKM, before financing costs, was in the 
region of NIS 750 million (UKM, 1989:5);  
3.  In their section on the Impact of Debt Financing, Kroll and Polovin (1997: 26-
28) perform a simulation, and deduct only “standard interest” of 5 percent from the 
gross product; in other words, they offset the exceptional or exorbitant interest. This 
exercise does indeed improve the relative position of the kibbutzim. Thus, in 1989, 
for example, per capita product in the kibbutz economy rose from 65 percent of the 
national economy, prior to the adjustment, to 72 percent after that. This is an ex-
pected result in the light of the model herein and the analysis in remark 2 above. 
The reason that the effect of the adjustment carried out by Kroll and Polovin is 
not even greater, seems to be the great magnitude of the kibbutz debt. Again, using 
the data of the UKM, its net debt (at June 1988 prices) rose from NIS 816 million in 
1982 to NIS 1,992 million in 1985, more than doubling in four years. In the next 
three years it continued to rise, reaching NIS 2,953 million in 1988 (UKM, 1989:9). 
These figures highlight the negative impact of the “interest effect” on the calculation 
of the efficiency of the kibbutz economy. Note that even “standard interest” of 5 
percent on such a debt, amounts to NIS 148 million, more than half of the actual 
financing costs in that year; 
4. An interesting question therefore arises, whether interest payments in the 
manufacturing sector could simply be ignored to enable the comparison. 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The model and the example in this section show 
that this intuitive solution is incorrect because it ignores the contribution of capital to 
the production function of the manufacturing sector. In other words, the sectors are 
not symmetrical (when one sector pays interest, and the other receives it), nor is there 
symmetry between the sectors and the economy as a whole (in which interest does 
not feature). Hence, they are not comparable. 
From Example A it can be shown that if financing costs are ignored in the manu-
facturing sector, the whole value of the product will be attributed to that sector, i.e., 
1,500 instead of 900. Product per worker will thus be overstated, becoming 21.4 (in-
stead of the previous value of 12.8), compared to a product of 15.0 per worker in the 
whole economy (which includes the financial sector). 
The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn is, therefore, that comparisons of like 
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whole, should not be made. It would be more correct to compare the kibbutz economy 
with similar ones, such as other agricultural economies, industrial plants or a combi-
nation of them, as was done by Barkai (1977, 1980) and Don (1988); 
5. Finally, the model presented herein assumes a closed economy which has no 
capital transactions with the outside world. In such a case the conclusions drown here 
are entirely correct. They are also fairly correct in the case of an open economy such 
as Israel’s. 
It can easily be seen that the financing costs on Israel’s net external debt do not 
exceed 1–5 percent of GNP.
13 On the other hand, in the data of the product of the 
kibbutz economy in 1989, for example, which Kroll and Polovin used, actual financing 
costs reached an average of 24 percent of the product.
14 In the Kibbutz Ha’artzi 
Movement alone, financing costs in that year (after appropriate adjustments)
15 came 
to about 35 percent. 
Removing values of such magnitude from the product of the kibbutz sector is 
likely to result in a significant downward bias in the assessment of its efficiency rela-
tive to that of the whole economy, and apparently had a major effect on the results 
obtained. 
The tax effect 
Economy with three sectors: manufacturing, financial and public 
The second effect on the measurement of the gross product of the kibbutz economy 
in Kroll and Polovin’s article (1997) relates to income tax. In principle, the concep-
tual analysis of the “tax effect” is similar to that of the “interest effect” in the 
previous section, although it is simpler at the theoretical level, and apparently of less 
significance at the quantitative level. 
Kroll and Polovin (1997:24) define disposable income as follows: “Disposable 
income is obtained by subtracting depreciation and taxes from gross production.” 
This is indeed the general accepted definition used in the literature. First, depre-
                                                        
13   The appropriate values of interest payments on Israel’s external debt, as a percentage of income in 
Israel, are: 
  1982  about 4 percent  (Bank of Israel; Annual Report 1985) 
  1989   about 3 percent  (Bank of Israel; Annual Report 1993) 
  1992   about 1 percent  (Bank of Israel; Annual Report 1993). 
  Here, the definition of income is slightly wider than that of GNP, so that these percentages should be 
increased marginally. 
14   These values are based on a preliminary version of their article, as the published version did not 
include a statistical appendix. It is assumed that even if the data changed to some extent, their order of 
magnitude would not have changed. The orders of magnitude referred to are supported also by the 1989 
Report of the UKM on the crisis and its causes, mentioned above. 
15   The adjustments referred to here relate to increasing the value of product by the value of internal 
services and the value of owner-occupied-housing services, as was done in the article under discussion. 148  E. Satt 
 
ciation is deducted from the GNP, to give Net National Product (NNP), and then 
taxes are deducted to obtain disposable income. 
Nevertheless, a more thorough inquiry indicates that the authors may actually re-
verse the order. Furthermore, a comparison of the data with those in an earlier article 
of the authors (Polovin and Kroll, 1995)
16 indicates that the data of gross product of 
the kibbutzim are, may be, given after deduction of taxes. Note that the value of dis-
posable income does not change as a result, but the gross product is no longer the one 
generally used in national accounting (before tax), but is in fact, what we will call the 
“gross disposable product” (after tax). If this is the case, then in comparing the gross 
product of the kibbutz economy to that of the whole economy there is a further ac-
counting bias, in addition to that of “interest effect”, – the “tax effect”.
17 
To clarify this point, the previous example will be extended to include a public 
sector (“government”) which imposes taxes, T, and supplies public goods and ser-
vices, G. For simplicity it is assumed that the same rate of tax, t, is levied on labor as 
on profits. 
Parallel with the expansion of the example, the conceptual formal model is also 
expanded in Appendix B. Again, there is a complete consistency between the equa-
tions in the model and in the example, but the letter A is added in the former to 
denote the appendix. 
Example B 
Suppose that the government that was established in Example A, sets an income tax, 
T of 20 percent (t = 0.2) on all income (labor and profit), and uses it to supply public 
goods and services, G. Also assume, for simplicity, that the tax is neutral, and that it 
has no further real effect on the economy.  
 
1.  The gross disposable product of the manufacturing sector will now be 
 
(9)  900 ∗ 0.8  =  720 
 Y 1(1 – t) 
 
                                                        
16  See Polovin and Kroll, 1995:322, Table 1 (Hebrew), and the article currently under discussion (Kroll 
and Polovin, 1997:24, Table 1). 
17  Although the kibbutz economy does benefit from national public goods (services) that it uses, they 
do not appear in its accounts. Put differently, the investment in a stretch of national road which leads to 
the kibbutz is not included in its accounts, nor does it relate to itself the expense on the appropriate num-
ber of policemen maintaining internal security nor that on the number of soldiers engaged in providing 
its external security.  
  In this case, too, as in the case of the interest payments, it could be claimed that strictly speaking an 
open economy has foreign relations, on which it pays “taxes” (membership), for example, membership of 
United Nations organizations. These payments are certainly insignificant relative to the size of the product.   The Comparison of Kibbutz Productivity to National Statistics  149 
 
2.  The gross disposable product of the financial sector will now be 
 
(10)  600 ∗ 0.8  =  480  
  Y2 (1 – t)  
 
3.  For simplicity assume a “balanced budget”, i.e., G = T; then the public expendi-
ture will be 
 
(11)  1500 ∗ 0.2  =  300 
   (T = Yt) = G 
 
The total gross disposable product (disposable income) of the two business sec-
tors (720 + 480 = 1,200) may be allocated to private consumption, C, and investment, 
I, in the economy.
18 Public consumption (300) must be added to this, and so the total 
value of the product of the economy remains at its previous level of 1,500. Saving 
the resources in the business sectors simply made room for government demand. 
This analysis shows clearly that if gross disposable product of the manufacturing 
sector Y1(1 – t) is compared to the national product, Y, yet another downward bias 
will be introduced to the assessment of the efficiency of that sector, in addition to the 
“interest effect”. 
As in the case of the “interest effect”, the above effect derives from internal trans-
fers of resources within the economy, i.e., from the business sectors to the public 
sector. Although such transfers affect each sector, at the national level they offset 
each other.  
Calculating product per worker after tax will reveal this new bias, in addition to 
the earlier “interest effect”. 
While product per worker in the whole economy remains unchanged at 15.0   
(=  1,500/100), gross disposable product per worker in the business sectors has   
declined: 
In the manufacturing sector it has gone down from 12.8 to 10.3 (= 720/70), and in 
the financial sector is has dropped from 20.0 to 16.0 (= 460/30). 
Note that in this example, product per worker in the manufacturing sector, which 
includes the kibbutz sector, is now only 69 percent (=10.3/15.0) of that in the whole 
economy. 
To summarize the “tax effect” on the measurement of product, note that if the 
product after tax of the kibbutz economy is compared with the pre-tax product of the 
national economy, a downward bias is created in the estimate of efficiency of the 
kibbutz economy. 
In the numerical example above, the “interest effect” causes a downward bias of 
15 percent in the measurement of the efficiency of the kibbutz economy, as product 
                                                        
18  For simplicity, depreciation was not included in the conceptual model, and is therefore not included 
in the numerical example. Its inclusion would raise no theoretical problems.  150  E. Satt 
 
per worker in the latter is only 85 percent of that in the national economy. The “tax 
effect” creates a further 16 percent bias, reducing the product per worker from 85 
percent to 69 percent of the national figure. 
However, perhaps herein lies a clue to what values might be more appropriate for 
comparison purposes. As the problem is now symmetrical between the sectors, with 
the tax imposed equally on the two kinds of businesses, and a comparison can be 
made with total disposable income, the bias can be corrected in two ways:
19 
•  By being consistent in comparing pre-tax product 
Gross pre-tax product of the kibbutz economy, Y1 is compared with the pre-tax 
product of the whole economy, Y. This is exactly what was done in the previous sec-
tion, and this gave product per worker in the kibbutz economy relative to that of the 
whole economy of 85 percent (=12.8/15.0); 
•  By being consistent in comparing after-tax disposable income. 
In the second method, disposable income (after tax) of the kibbutz economy, Y1(1 – t), 
is compared with that of the national economy, Y(1 – t). Example B gives, in this 
case, the following results: disposable income per worker in the manufacturing sector 
is 10.3 (=720/70), and that in the whole economy is 12.0 (=1,500*0.8/100), thus re-
turning to the same efficiency ratio of 85 percent (=10.3/12.0). 
Although both methods still suffer from the “interest effect”, the ‘tax effect’ 
which reduced the relative efficiency to 69 percent, has been avoided. 
This analysis shows that the comparison of disposable income in Kroll and 
Polovin may be less biased than is the comparison of the gross product. The data in 
Tables 2 in Kroll and Polovin (1997:25) show that in 1982 per capita disposable in-
come in the kibbutz was 94 percent of the national figure. Bearing in mind the 
significance of the “interest effect”, it may be supposed from here that until 1982 at 
least, prior to the severe economic crisis, the kibbutz economy was not less efficient 
than the national economy, and may actually have been more efficient. 
From the data available, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the steep de-
cline of per capita disposable income in the kibbutz economy in the period that 
followed: in 1989 it dropped to 48 percent of the national figure, in 1992 it was 53 
percent, and in 1994, 61 percent (Kroll and Polovin, 1997:25).  
It appears that several major causes were responsible, the general direction of 
which can only be roughly estimated here: 
1.  Interest payments (debt financing) rose very drastically in the crisis period. 
Data from the UKM show an eightfold rise (net), from NIS 36 million in 1982 to NIS 
292 million in 1988, both at June 1988 prices (UKM, 1989:8); 
2.  Tax payments, on the other hand, did not rise, and may actually have fallen as 
a result of the decline in profitability. The UKM figures indicate stability in this area: 
NIS 43 million in 1982 compared with NIS 46 million in 1988 at June 1988 prices 
(UKM, 1989:8); 
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3.  Depreciation on earlier investments rose significantly, as Kroll and Polovin 
note (1997: 25–26), pointing out the connection between disposable income and pre-
vious investment. The UKM report shows an increase of 50 percent in productive 
and consumer depreciation between 1982 and 1988 (UKM, 1989:5). This may be the 
result of the acceleration in investment in the years prior to the crisis; 
The investment factor itself is of great interest and importance in this context,  
affecting almost any aspects of economic analysis: productivity and product growth; 
the level of savings; and the extent of depreciation, among others. However, as no 
data relevant to this point are given by the authors, we will not discuss it further; 
4. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the intense shock caused by the crisis 
had a severe effect on the kibbutz economy and society, and resulted in a real decline 
in its output.  
In the UKM report (UKM, 1989: Chapter 1) an interesting attempt is made to  
assess the causes of the crisis in greater detail. 
Summary and conclusions 
This article examines conceptual problems in measuring product and disposable   
income of the kibbutz economy, and comparing them with figures of the national 
economy. The main conclusion is that comparing sectors, which have their specific 
characteristics, with the whole economy, is a hazardous undertaking, and is subject to 
serious biases. This is because the “terms of trade” between the sectors, and the  
implied income transfers, affect the value of per capita product in all sectors, and 
may be misinterpreted as relative efficiency or inefficiency of the sectors. 
At the level of the national accounting theory, this conclusion may be summa-
rized as a proposition: 
 
Proposition: Logical conditions for comparing products of different sectors 
From a logical point of view, using national accounting tools (“value-added”) 
to compare different economies is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
Other considerations relating to structural and functional similarities among 
the economies/sectors (referred to in the article as symmetry) must also be 
taken into account. 
 
This claim is a familiar one in the literature with regard to comparisons of differ-
ent national economies, for example, the US and China. This article extends it to the 
sphere of different sectors of a given economy, and hence to the comparison of each 
sector with its national economy. 
Two major points arising from Kroll and Polovin’s article (1997) could cause 
downward bias in a comparison of the kibbutz economy with the national one: the 
“interest effect” and the “tax effect”. 
The “interest effect” is apparently the more significant one. The two-sector model 152  E. Satt 
 
in the current article shows that whereas it is appropriate to deduct interest from the 
calculation of the (“absolute”) value-added of the manufacturing sector (and the kib-
butz economy), the latter cannot be compared (“relatively”) to that of the whole 
economy. This is so since at the national level, interest paid by the manufacturing 
sector is offset by interest received by the financial sector. 
The simulation performed by Kroll and Polovin when they restricted real interest 
to a “standard” level of 5 percent (ignoring the exceptional or “exorbitant” interest) 
only partially corrected the result, due to the huge size of the kibbutz debt. 
A similar conclusion was reached regarding the “tax effect”. In a three-sector 
economy (extended to include the public sector) it was shown that conceptually the 
value of the product of the manufacturing sector (the kibbutz economy) after tax 
cannot be compared to that of the national economy, because the deduction of tax 
payments in the national economy is offset by additional public consumption. In this 
case too there is an income transfer from the business sectors (both manufacturing 
and financial) to the public sector. 
Within the limitations of time and space of the current article it is not possible to 
estimate the overall downward bias in a comparison of the kibbutz per capita product 
with the national one. It seems, however, that one would not be far wrong in assess-
ing it in two-digit, rather than single digit percentage terms. 
Regarding the kibbutz economy itself, the main question requiring attention is 
how compatible are Kroll and Polovin’s (1997) findings with those of earlier re-
search, mainly that of Barkai (1977, 1980) and Don (1988), which showed the 
relative economic robustness of that economy. Of specific interest is the central ques-
tion of what happened to the kibbutz economy in the severe crisis of the 1980s. Why 
did what appeared till then to be a relatively sound economy, suffer so greatly as to 
jeopardize its very survival? And in particular, how did the real (net) interest pay-
ments of the United Kibbutz Movement rose tenfold in real terms in the years from 
1982 to 1985? And how did the real debt more than double in those years? 
Finally, could it be that it was not structural inefficiency of the kibbutz economy 
that led to the crisis, but on the contrary, that the external—mainly financial—crisis 
and the shock it brought in its wake, led to what was seen as economic inefficiency? 
These questions require further research which would be based inter alia on the 
data gathered and brought by Kroll and Polovin, taking into account the lessons and 
conclusions of the current article. 
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Appendix A 
A Formal Model of Economy with Two Sectors: Manufacturing and Financial 
The values shown below represent values of the services provided by the factors of 
production, in terms of annual flows.
20 
1.  The manufacturing sector  
a)  Aggregate profit 
 
(1Α)    Π1  =  Y –  rK –  wL1 
     value  of  =   value of  –   value of  – value  of 
   entrepreneurship    product     capital      labor  
 
where r is the cost of capital, so that rK are costs of debt-financing; w is the 
wage rate, so that wL1 is the labor costs (of the manufacturing sector). 
 
b)  Value-added of the manufacturing sector 
The calculation of the value-added is based on the generally accepted method, 
i.e., it is the value of the product less expenses on outside (external) factors of 
production (see, for example, Satt, 1983).
21 
 
(2Α)   Y 1  = Y – rK =  Π1  + wL1 
        product      =   resources 
2. The  financial  sector 
a)  Aggregate profit 
 
(3Α)          Π2     =  rK –    wL2 
      value  of   =   value of  –   value of 
     entrepreneurship     capital   labor   
 
b)  Value-added of the financial sector 
 
(4Α)         Y2  =  rK = Π2  +  wL2   
       product  =   resources 
       (capital  services) 
                                                        
20  The terms which should have been used are: the value of (annual) capital services, instead of the 
value of capital; the value of labor services, instead of the value of labor; and the value of entrepreneur-
ship services instead of the value of entrepreneurship. The terminology used here was chosen for 
purposes of simplicity. 
21   This approach is also acceptable to Kroll and Polovin (1997:24). 156  E. Satt 
 
3.  The whole economy 
 
(5A)   Y =    Y1   +  Y2 
 
But from (2) and (4), 
 
(6A)     Y = (Y –  rK)  +  rK 
 




(8A)     Y  = (Π1  +  Π2) +  w (L1  +  L2)  
     total  value  =   total value of   +   total  value  of 
      of product    entrepreneurship       labor 
 
Appendix B 
A Formal Model of Economy with Three Sectors: Manufacturing, Financial, and 
public 
The previous model (in Appendix A) is extended to include a public sector   
(“government”) which imposes taxes, T, and supplies public goods and services, G. 
For simplicity it is assumed that the same rate of tax, t, is levied on labor as on profits. 
 
The model is expanded thus: 
 
1.  Gross disposable product (disposable income) of the manufacturing sector will 
now be [from (2)] 
 
 (9A)   Y1(1 – t) = (Π1 + wL1)(1 – t)  
 
2. Similarly,  gross disposable product of the financial sector will now be [from (4)] 
 
 (10A)    Y2(1 – t) = (Π2 + wL2)(1 – t) 
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3.  The national product will be 
 
(11A)    Y = [(Π1 + Π2) + w(L1 + L2)](1−t) + G 
 
For simplicity assume a “balanced budget”, i.e., G = T; then  
 
(12A)      G = Yt = [(Π1 + Π2) + w(L1 + L2)] t 
 
 from  (8A).  
 
  Now by substituting (12A) into (11A), it can be seen that the national product has 
not changed from the case without a public sector: 
 




(14A)    Y = [(Π1 + Π2) + w(L1 + L2)]  
 
  as before in (8A). Saving the resources in the business sectors simply made room 
for government demand. 